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Abstract 
During the last two decades the European Union has become a major actor 
in the field of asylum law. Meanwhile, human rights law, in particular the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has become of paramount 
importance in this field. This paper highlights certain areas of concern in the 
European Asylum System from the viewpoint of the ECHR. It particularly 
focuses on the Dublin II Regulation, the reception conditions and the 
detention of asylum seekers.  
A. Introduction 
During the 1990’s and the 2000’s the European Union (EU) has 
developed an extensive set of instruments in the field of asylum law. The 
emerging European Asylum Law should however not be considered in a 
legal vacuum: ever since the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol, international law has been of 
paramount importance in this field. In the last decades the protection of 
refugees and asylum seekers has been particularly shaped by evolutions in 
international human rights law. 
At the level of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), the supranational court supervising the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has contributed significantly to the 
protection of asylum seekers in Europe. 
Firstly, under Art. 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and of inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, the Court has developed extensive 
case-law concerning asylum seekers. According to the ECtHR, “expulsion 
by a Contracting State of an asylum seeker may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the 
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person concerned faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he 
was returned.”1 In this context, it is of crucial importance that asylum 
 
1 E.g. Vilvarajah and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (1991) Appl. No. 
13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87, Series A, No. 215, 34, para. 103. 
Art. 3 ECHR also prohibits “refoulement” of a person to a country where he or she 
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seekers have the possibility of demanding a binding interim measure from 
the ECtHR under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court2 to prevent such an 
expulsion. Secondly, the ECtHR has developed procedural guarantees in 
asylum cases under Art. 13 ECHR, the right to an effective remedy against 
breaches of the ECHR or its protocols,3 and Art. 4 Protocol No. 4, the 
prohibition of collective expulsions.4 Finally, Art. 5 ECHR, the right to 
liberty and security, is particularly important in the context of detention of 
asylum seekers,5 while Art. 8 ECHR, the right to respect for private and 
family life, provides some protection against the expulsion of asylum 
seekers with a family in the host country.6 
This paper will focus on the impact of human rights law, in particular 
the ECHR, on European Asylum Law. As an exhaustive analysis would be 
beyond the scope of a short paper, this paper will highlight a few important 
recent developments which have redefined this relationship. The entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty has made some changes to the EU constitutional 
framework in the field of asylum law and significant changes to the EU 
system of human rights protection. Meanwhile discussions are on-going 
about the introduction of new pieces of legislation, recasting the current EU 
asylum instruments. A recast Qualification Directive was adopted at the end 
of 2011, while it is expected that the other recast instruments will be 
 
runs a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the 
United Kingdom, ECHR (2010) Appl. No. 61498/08, para. 120).  
2 Art. 34 ECHR, the prohibition of hindering the effective exercise of the individual 
applicant’s right of application, is the legal basis for the binding character of interim 
measures (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ECHR (2005), Appl. Nos. 46827/99 
and 46951/99, para. 128). 
3 In particular the requirement that a remedy against a removal measure must have 
suspensive effect, e.g. Čonka v. Belgium, ECHR (2002), Appl. No. 51564/99, para. 
79; Gebremedhin v. France, ECHR, (2007), Appl. No. 25389/05, para. 58. 
4 In particular the requirement that aliens cannot be compelled, as a group, to leave a 
country, except when such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and 
objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group, e.g. 
Čonka v. Belgium, ECHR (2002), Appl. No. 51564/99, para. 59. 
5 See infra no. F. 
6 Such an expulsion constitutes an interference with the right to respect for the family 
life, which can only be justified in so far as it is “in accordance with the law” and 
when it is “necessary in a democratic society” in the interests of a legitimate aim. E.g. 
Amrollahi v. Denmark, ECHR (2002), Appl. No. 56811/00, para. 28. The right to 
private life provides some protection against the expulsion of “settled migrants” 
without a family life in the host country (e.g. Üner v. The Netherlands, ECHR (2006), 
Appl. No. 46410/99, para. 59). 
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adopted in the course of 2012. The ECtHR on its turn has had the 
opportunity to touch upon the application of EU asylum instruments, in 
particular in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. 
First this paper will give an introduction to the EU system of human 
rights protection (B.), as well as to the competences of the EU in the field of 
asylum law and the main instruments of European Asylum Law (C.). 
Subsequently the paper will focus on some important human rights 
challenges presented to European Asylum Law, in particular the “Dublin II” 
system of responsibility for examining asylum applications (D.), the 
reception (E.) and the detention of asylum seekers (F.). 
B. Fundamental Rights and the European Union 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Art. 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) provides a threefold system of human rights 
protection in the EU legal system: the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
general principles of the Union’s law.7 
I. Charter of Fundamental Rights 
1. General Provisions 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the 
adapted version of 12 December 2007,8 has acquired “the same legal value 
as the Treaties” at the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.9 The Charter 
can thus be considered as a third treaty, besides the TEU and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).10 
The Charter is addressed “to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union [...] and to the Member States only when they are 
 
7 S. Peers, ‘Human Rights in the EU Legal Order: Practical Relevance for EC 
Immigration and Asylum Law’, in S. Peers & N. Rogers (eds), EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law – Text and Commentary (2006), 115, 132. 
8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 14.12.2007, OJ 2007 C 303/ 1 
[Charter]. 
9 Art. 6 para. 1 Treaty on European Union (TEU). See Protocol on the Application of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United 
Kingdom, OJ 2007 C 306/156 for some restrictions in the applicability of the Charter 
with regard to these countries. 
10 R. Barents, Het Verdrag van Lissabon (2008), 537. 
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implementing Union law.”11 The provisions of the Charter are thus binding 
on Member States, but only “when they act in the scope of Union law”.12 As 
the EU has developed a comprehensive set of asylum instruments, most 
decisions in asylum matters taken by Member States will come within the 
scope of EU law.13 The Charter further explicitly provides that it does not 
extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union 
or “establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and 
tasks as defined in the Treaties.”14 
The Charter distinguishes between “rights” and “principles”. Rights 
must be “respected” while principles must only be “observed”.15 Principles 
“may be implemented by legislative and executive acts [...]. They shall be 
judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling 
on their legality” and can thus not be considered as subjective rights.16 
With regard to Charter rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the ECHR, the Charter states that “the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention”, without 
however preventing Union law to provide “more extensive protection”.17 A 
list of these corresponding rights is incorporated in the Explanations relating 
to the Charter.18 Thereby the ECHR is partially incorporated in the Charter 
and thus in EU primary law.19 Charter provisions recognizing “fundamental 
rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States [...] shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.”20 
The Charter contains a general limitations clause. Limitations on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are only 
acceptable when they are “provided for by law” and “respect the essence of 
 
11 Art. 51 para. 1, first sentence Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
[Charter]. 
12 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [Explanations relating to 
the Charter], OJ 2007.C303/32.The Explanations provide guidance to the 
interpretation of the Charter and “shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union 
and of the Member States.” (Art. 52 para. 7 Charter). 
13 Peers, supra note 7, 137. 
14 Art. 51 para. 2 Charter. 
15 Art. 51 para. 1, second sentence Charter. 
16 Art. 52 para. 5 Charter. 
17 Art. 52 para. 3 second sentence Charter. 
18 Explanations relating to the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303/33-34.  
19 W. Weiß, ‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention 
on Human Rights After Lisbon’, 7 European Constitutional Law Review (2011) 1, 64, 
70. 
20 Art. 52 para. 4 Charter. 
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those rights and freedoms.”21 Limitations are also subject to the 
proportionality principle, which requires that they are “necessary” and that 
they “genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”22 
Nothing in the Charter, including the general limitations clause, “shall 
be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all Member States are party, including the 
[ECHR], and by the Member States’ constitutions.”23 This provision is 
intended to maintain the current level of fundamental rights protection.24 
2. Specific Provisions 
Some of the substantive Charter provisions are particularly important 
from the viewpoint of EU asylum law. Art. 18 of the Charter stipulates that 
“[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of 
the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.”According to Battjes, the right to asylum is the right to a durable 
solution, which includes the right to an appropriate status25. The Charter is 
the first document since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) to contain a right to asylum.26 The Geneva Convention only 
recognizes the principle of non-refoulement27 and implicitly the right to 
seek, but not the right to enjoy asylum.28 Nor does the ECHR or its 
Protocols guarantee such a right.29 
 
21 Art. 52 para. 1, first sentence Charter. 
22 Art. 52 para. 1, second sentence Charter. 
23 Art. 53 Charter. 
24 Explanations relating to the Charter , OJ 2007 C 303/35. 
25 H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law (2006), 112-114. 
26 Art. 14 UDHR recognizes both the right to seek and the right to enjoy asylum from 
persecution (D. McGoldrick, ‘The Charter and United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties’ in S. Peers & A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2004) 
83, 113-114). 
27 Art. 33 para. 1 Convention Relating the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention 
1967). 
28 S. Da Lomba, The right to seek refugee status in the European Union (2004), 8-10. 
29 E.g. Chahal v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (1996) Appl. No. 22414/93, para. 73. 
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Art. 19 para. 2 of the Charter on its turn provides that “[n]o one may 
be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk 
that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This incorporates the case-
law of the ECtHR regarding Art. 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and of 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.30 
Art. 47 para. 2 of the Charter is relevant in the context of asylum and 
expulsion procedures. This provision states that “[e]veryone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented.” This corresponds to 
Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR, the right to a fair trial, but unlike the latter provision, 
Art. 47para. 2 Charter is not confined to the determination of civil rights and 
obligations or of a criminal charge.31 The ECtHR has ruled that Art. 6 para. 
1 ECHR is not applicable in the context of decisions concerning the entry, 
stay and deportation of aliens.32 Art. 47 para. 2 ECHR on the other hand 
does cover migration and asylum procedures.33 
Finally Art. 6 of the Charter states that “[e]veryone has the right to 
liberty and security of person.” This provision corresponds to Art. 5 ECHR, 
the right to liberty and security34. This provision may be particularly 
relevant in the context of the detention of asylum seekers.  
II. Accession to the ECHR 
The Lisbon Treaty provides that the European Union shall accede to 
the European Convention on Human Rights.35 Thereby the Member States 
 
30 Explanations relating to the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303/24. 
31 Explanations relating to the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303/ 30. 
32 Maaouia v. France, ECHR (2000) Appl. No. 39652/98, para. 40.The Court has 
however accepted extensive procedural obligations in asylum and migration cases 
under Art. 13 ECHR, the right to an effective remedy (e.g. Čonka v. Belgium, ECHR 
(2002) Appl. No. 51564/99; Gebremedhin v. France, ECHR (2007), Appl. No. 
25389/05). 
33 See European Court of Justice Case 69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf vs. Minister for 
Labour, Employment and Immigration (Luxembourg) [ECJ 28 July 2011] (court 
decision not yet reported).  
34 Explanations relating to the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303/19. 
35 Art. 6 para. 2 TEU. As early as 1979 the European Commission called for the 
accession to the ECHR (European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the 
European Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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have met the objections of the Court of Justice, which had ruled that the 
accession to the ECHR “would be of constitutional significance” and 
therefore required a treaty basis36. Since the entry into force of Protocol No. 
14 to the ECHR on 1 June 2010, the new Art. 59 para. 2 ECHR stipulates 
that “[t]he European Union may accede to the Convention”. 
On 7 July 2010 official talks started between the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe on the EU’s accession to the ECHR. 
At the end of the negotiations an accession agreement will be concluded 
between the 47 contracting parties of the ECHR and the European Union, 
acting by unanimous decision of the Council and with consent of the 
European Parliament.37 The accession agreement needs ratification by all 
EU and Council of Europe Member States. The ratification process will 
probably take some years.38 
A protocol to the Lisbon Treaty requires that the accession agreement 
“shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the 
Union and Union law, in particular with regard to […] the specific 
arrangements for the Union's possible participation in the control bodies of 
 
Fundamental Freedoms, 2 May 1979, Com (1979) 210 final, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 2/79, 8). 
36 Opinion of the Court on the Accession by the Community to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2/94, ECR 1996, I-
01759. 
37 Press release European Commission no. IP/10/906, 
http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/906&format=D
OC&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 22 April 2012). The 
Council of Europe Steering Committee for Human Rights has published a Report to 
the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal instruments for the accession 
of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 October 
2011, CDDH(2011)009 and a Final version of the draft legal instruments on the 
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, 19 
July 2011, CDDH-UE(2011)16, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/source/
Docs 2011/CDDH-UE_2011_16_final_en.pdf (last visited 2 May 2012). On this draft 
agreement, see X. Groussot, T. Lock & L. Pech, Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la 
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: analyse juridique du projet d’accord 
d’adhésion du 14 octobre 2011 (7 November 2011) available at http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-218 (last visited 2 May 2012). 
38 H. Mahony, ‘EU bid to join human rights convention poses tricky questions’ (2010) 
available at http://euobserver.com/18/29711 (last visited 2 May 2012). It took almost 
six years before Protocol No. 14 was ratified by all Council of Europe member states, 
due to obstruction by Russia. 
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the European Convention […]”39 Other technical issues that need to be 
solved relate inter alia to the relationship between the Court of Justice and 
the ECtHR, e.g. the possibility of the introduction of a preliminary reference 
procedure by which the Court of Justice could request an interpretation of 
the ECHR from the ECtHR40 and the question of whether the EU will also 
accede to the Protocols to the ECHR.41 
While the European institutions are already bound by the ECHR as a 
matter of European law,42 as a result of the accession, the European Union’s 
international responsibility under the ECHR for human rights violations 
may be engaged. By acceding, the EU will equally subject itself to external 
scrutiny in the field of human rights, i.e. the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Currently the ECtHR declares applications directed 
against the European Union inadmissible ratione personae.43 
The ECtHR however, does examine nationally implemented EU 
measures. In the famous Bosphorus-case,44 the European Court of Human 
Rights stated that there’s a presumption that actions taken by Member States 
in the execution of EU legal obligations45 are in compliance with the ECHR, 
because the protection of fundamental rights by the European Union is 
considered to be “equivalent” to that of the Convention system.46 This 
presumption can however be rebutted “if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was 
 
39 Protocol relating to Art. 6 para. 2 of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession 
of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, OJ C 17 (2007), 306/ 155. 
40 For more details: Steering Committee for Human Rights, Technical and legal issues of 
possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, 53th 
meeting, 25-28 June 2002, CDDH(2002)020 Addendum 2, available at 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Meeting reports committee/53rd_en.pdf (last 
visited 2 May 2012).  
41 Weiß, supra note 19, 91. 
42 By application of the general principles of EU law (see B.III) or indirectly through the 
Charter (see B.I, 1). 
43 E.g. Connolly v. 15 EU Member States, ECHR (2008) Appl. No. 73274/01. 
44 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, ECHR (2005), 
Appl. No. 45036/98. 
45 The Court restricted the Bosphorus-presumption to Community law in the strict sense, 
at that time the first pillar of the European Union (para. 72). In the light of the 
abolition of the pillar structure by the Lisbon Treaty, the presumption arguably applies 
to all areas in which the Court of Justice has full jurisdiction. 
46 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland, ECHR (2005) 
Appl. No. 45036/98, para. 165. 
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manifestly deficient.”47 The presumption does not apply to acts falling 
outside a Member State’s strict EU legal obligations, in particular when they 
exercise State discretion.48 It is possible that the ECtHR will change its 
deferential attitude towards the EU in the event of EU accession to the 
ECHR,49 as this attitude is justified by the fact that the EU is currently not a 
party to the ECHR50. 
III. General Principles 
The TEU states that fundamental rights, in particular as guaranteed by 
the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, shall constitute general principles of EU law.51 This is 
the explicit recognition of the case-law of the Court of Justice, which has 
accepted that 
 
“fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of law, the observance of which it ensures. In 
safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration 
from constitutional traditions common to the member states, and 
it cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible 
with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the 
constitutions of those states. Similarly, international treaties for 
the protection of human rights on which the member states have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
community law.”52 
 
The Court of Justice however only examines the compatibility of 
national legislation with fundamental rights in so far as it falls within the 
scope of application of European law.53 
 
47 Id., para. 156. 
48 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 30696/09, para. 338.  
49 F. van den Berghe, ‘The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection: Same Solutions 
to More Acute Problems?’, 16 European Law Journal (2010) 2, 112, 149. 
50 Weiß, supra note 19, 95 
51 Art. 6 para. 3 TEU. 
52 Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, [1974], ECR 491 para. 13. 
53 E.g. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebish Gmuend, [1987] ECR 3719, para. 28; 
Peers, supra note 7, 117. 
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The importance of general principles as source of fundamental rights 
in the European Union will undoubtedly decrease as the Charter has 
acquired legal binding effect and the Union will accede to the ECHR. The 
general principles nonetheless allow the Court of Justice to provide for a 
higher standard of protection than the Charter and the ECHR or for 
additional rights.54 The general principles may also be relevant in so far as 
their scope might be broader than the scope of the Charter: a restrictive 
interpretation of the latter may not include situations in which Member 
States take actions which derogate from EU law, as in such circumstances 
Member States are not “implementing Union Law”.55 According to the 
Court of Justice, such actions do come within the scope of application of 
European law and therefore the general principles are applicable.56 
IV. Conclusion 
The three systems of human rights protection overlap to a high degree. 
In case of divergence, the standards which provide the highest level of 
protection should be applied.57 The ECHR has been assigned a preeminent 
position in this construction, which is structurally reflected in the references 
to the ECHR as a minimum standard with regard to corresponding Charter 
rights and as a primary source of the general principles of EU law. 
C. Common European Asylum System 
At the entry into force in 1993 of the Maastricht Treaty, the European 
Union gained competences in the field of asylum and immigration policy as 
a part of the now abolished third pillar concerning “Justice and Home 
Affairs”.58 The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999, 
incorporated asylum and immigration policy in the Treaty establishing the 
 
54 Weiß, supra note 19, 92. 
55 Art. 51 para. 1, first sentence Charter. See C. Franklin, ‘The Legal Status of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 15 Tilburg Law Review 
(2010-2011) 2, 137, 153-155. 
56 E.g. Case 260/89, ERT v. DEP, [1991] ECR I-2925. The explanations suggest that the 
scope of the Charter should be interpreted in line with the case-law of the Court of 
Justice on the scope of the general principles (Explanations relating to the Charter , OJ 
2007.C 303/32), excluding such a restrictive interpretation of Art. 51, para. 1, first 
sentence, Charter. 
57 Weiß, supra note 19, 74-75. 
58 Art. K.1. Treaty of Maastricht (TEU); Battjes, supra note 25, 28. 
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European Community (since 2009: TFEU), thus transferring this area from 
the third (intergovernmental) to the first (supranational) pillar.59 The 
growing EU competences in this field are reflected in the so-called Tampere 
Conclusions in which the European Council agreed to work towards the 
establishment of a Common European Asylum System.60 
I. Competences 
Asylum and immigration policy are part of Title V TFEU, the so-
called “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”.61 Measures in the field of 
asylum and immigration law must be adopted jointly by the European 
Parliament and the Council, deciding by qualified majority,62 in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure.63 The Lisbon Treaty extends the 
competences of the Court of Justice: the Court now principally has full 
jurisdiction in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice under the same 
conditions as other fields of EU law.64 This will undoubtedly lead to a 
 
59 Battjes, supra note 25, 29. 
60 Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 – Presidency Conclusions, SN 
200/99, www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, para. 14 (last visited 3 April 
2012); Battjes, supra note 25, 30. 
61 P. Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance’, 33 European 
Law Review 2, 2008, 137, 142. 
62 Art. 16 (3) Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that “(t)he Council shall act by 
a qualified majority, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.” See Craig, supra 
note 61, 154. 
63 Art. 78 (asylum) and Art. 79 (immigration) TFEU. The ordinary legislative procedure 
is outlined in Art. 294 TFEU. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, co-
decision was already required in the field of asylum law and the Council already acted 
by qualified majority, while in the field of immigration law unanimity in the Council 
was required and the European Parliament was merely consulted (S. Peers, 
‘Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making 
in the Treaty of Lisbon’, 10 European Journal of Migration and Law, 2008, 219, 
240). 
64 See S. Carruthers, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and the Reformed Jurisdictional Powers of 
the European Court of Justice in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs’, European 
Human Rights Law Review (2009) 6, 784-804. The main restriction to the Court’s 
jurisdiction is Art. 276 TFEU, which states that “[i]n exercising its powers regarding 
the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three relating to the area of 
freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have 
no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the 
police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security.” As a transitional measure, the 
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significant increase of the Court’s activities in the field of asylum and 
immigration law.65 
The European Parliament and the Council have the competence to 
adopt measures for a Common European Asylum System, comprising a 
uniform status of asylum (a) and subsidiary protection (b), a common 
system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of 
massive inflow (c), common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of 
uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status (d), criteria and mechanisms 
for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an 
application for asylum or subsidiary protection (e), standards concerning the 
conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum or subsidiary 
protection (f) and partnership and cooperation with third countries in the 
context of asylum or temporary protection (g).66 
At first sight, the Lisbon Treaty has not significantly changed the 
competences in the field of asylum law67. Interestingly however, while the 
old Art. 63 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ECT) 
generally only allowed for the adoption of “minimum standards” in the field 
of asylum law,68 Art. 78 TFEU no longer contains this limitation.69 This is 
highly relevant from the viewpoint of human rights protection. Before the 
Lisbon Treaty, it may well have been argued that the Member States still 
exclusively bore the final responsibility for the development of a legal 
framework which effectively protects the fundamental rights of asylum 
seekers – as they were free to provide more protection than EU “minimum 
standards”. As the EU has gained harmonisation competences, the positive 
obligation to provide such a legal framework70 has arguably (at least 
 
Court’s jurisdiction will remain unchanged with respect to old “third pillar” acts 
which have been adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, until these 
acts are amended or until five years have elapsed since the entry into force (Art. 10 
Protocol on transitional provisions, OJ C. 17 December 2007, No. 306, 159). These 
restrictions are however irrelevant in the field of asylum law. 
65 Peers, supra note 63, 219.On the restrictions of the old Art. 68 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, see S. Peers, ‘Finally ‘Fit for Purpose’? The 
Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal Order’, 27 Yearbook of 
European Law (2008) 1, 47, 48-51. 
66 Art. 78 para. 2 TFEU. For an elaborate discussion, see Peers, supra note 63, 219-247. 
67 For a comparison of the TFEU before and after the Treaty of Lisbon, see Id., 232-238. 
68 With the exception of Art. 63 para. 1, a), ECT which constituted the legal basis for the 
Dublin system. 
69 Peers, supra note 63, 232-238, 233.  
70 Starner considers the “duty to put in place a legal framework which provides effective 
protection for Convention rights” as the first and foremost type of positive obligation 
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partially)71 shifted in its direction. After the accession to the ECHR,72 the 
international responsibility of the EU may thus be engaged if it fails to 
comply with that positive obligation. To avoid this situation, it is necessary 
that the Court of Justice applies its increased jurisdiction to raise standards 
of human rights protection in the field of EU asylum law. This is 
particularly important in the light of the upcoming recasts of major pieces of 
EU asylum legislation. 
II. Instruments 
1. Qualification Directive 
In order to understand the scope of European Asylum Law – and thus 
of this paper – it is necessary to first discuss the Qualification Directive73. 
This Directive lays down minimum standards for the qualification of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted.74 The Directive does not prevent Member States from introducing 
 
under the ECHR (S. Karner, ‘Positive Obligations Under the Convention’ in J. Lowell 
& J. Cooper (eds) Understanding Human Rights Principles (2001), 147). Similarly A. 
Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), 5. 
71 The case Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, ECHR (2004) Appl. No. 
48787/99, is a perfect example of how the same situation can attract the international 
responsibility of two distinct parties to the Convention, each within their own 
competences. 
72 See above chapter B, subtitle II. 
73 On 13 December 2011 a recast version of the Qualification Directive was adopted: 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted 
(recast) (Recast Qualification Directive). Directive 2004/83/EC will be repealed with 
effect from 21 December 2013 (Art. 40 Recast Qualification Directive), the 
transposition deadline of the recast directive (Art. 39, para. 1 Recast Qualification 
Directive). Unless stated otherwise, this paper will discuss Directive OJ L 304, 
2004/83/EC; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards 
for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of 
the protection granted (Qualification Directive).  
74 Art. 1 Qualification Directive. Besides these two statuses, European Asylum Law also 
provides for a temporary protection status in case of a mass influx of displaced 
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or retaining more favourable standards for determining who qualifies as a 
refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection, and for determining 
the content of international protection, insofar as those standards are 
compatible with the Directive.75 
The Directive defines a refugee as: 
 
“a third country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is 
outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being 
outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same 
reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
unwilling to return to it, and to whom Article 12 does not 
apply.”76  
 
This definition encompasses all elements necessary for the 
determination of refugee status as set out in the Geneva Convention.77 A 
 
persons, which must be established by the Council, see: Council Directive 
2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in 
the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance 
of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons end bearing the 
consequences thereof (Temporary Protection Directive). This procedure has not been 
applied so far. On this Directive, see S. Peers & N. Rogers, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law (2006), 453-485. 
75 Art. 3 Qualification Directive. Similarly, Art. 3 Recast Qualification Directive. 
76 Art. 2 (c) Qualification Directive. Similarly Art. 2 (d) Recast Qualification Directive. 
The reasons for persecution are set further explained in Art. 10 Qualification 
Directive. Art. 10 Recast Qualification Directive takes gender related aspects more 
seriously in defining whether a group constitutes “a particular social group” and 
explicitly stresses the need to give due consideration to gender identity.  
77 Under the Geneva Convention, a “refugee” is “any person who [...] owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence […], is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it” (Art. 1, A, (2) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Geneva, 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
New York, 31 January 1967 (Geneva Convention 1967)). Art. 12 Qualification 
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notable difference however is that the Directive is only applicable to third-
country nationals – persons who do not have the nationality of an EU 
Member State – while the Geneva Convention does not contain a 
geographical limitation. This is in line with a Protocol which was annexed 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community (the current TFEU) at 
the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which principally states that an 
asylum application made by a national of a EU Member State may not be 
taken into consideration or declared admissible.78 The Protocol’s application 
will be incompatible with respectively Art. 33 para. 1 Geneva Convention 
and/or Art. 3 ECHR as well as Art. 19 para. 2 of the Charter, if it results in 
the removal of an EU citizen to a Member State where there is a well-
founded fear of persecution and/or a real risk of ill-treatment.79 
The Qualification Directive provides a second type of international 
protection: subsidiary protection is “complementary and additional to the 
refugee protection enshrined in the Geneva Convention”.80  
 
A person eligible for subsidiary protection is: 
 
“a third country national or a stateless person who does not 
qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds 
 
Directive incorporates the exclusion grounds of Art. 1, D, E and F Geneva Convention 
1967; Battjes, supra note 25, 222. 
78 Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union, OJ .C. 10 
November 1997, No. 340, 103. The Qualification Directive explicitly states that it is 
“without prejudice to” this Protocol (consideration 13). The Protocol contains a very 
restrictive list of exceptions: (a) when the Member States derogate from the ECHR in 
application of Art. 15 ECHR; (b) if a procedure under Art. 7, para. 1 TEU has been 
initiated; (c) if the Council, in application of Art. 7, para. 1 TEU, has established the 
existence of a “serious and persistent breach” of the values referred to in Art. 2 TEU; 
or (d) if a Member State unilaterally decides to do so, but only if it immediately 
informs the Council and if the application is dealt with on the basis of a presumption 
that it is manifestly ill-founded. Belgium has made a declaration to the protocol, in 
which it stated that “it shall, in accordance with the provision set out in point (d) [...], 
carry out an individual examination of any asylum request made by a national of 
another Member State” (OJ .C. 10 November 1997, No. 340, 144). Strikingly, Spain 
had lodged the proposal for the Protocol, exactly because Belgium had refused to 
extradite a Basque couple which was suspected of aiding ETA terrorists. 
79 The case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 30696/09 
illustrates that a removal to an EU Member State may well violate Art. 3 ECHR, see 
D.3. 
80 Preamble, (24) Qualification Directive. 
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have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if 
returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a 
stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual 
residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as 
defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not 
apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of that country.”81  
 
Art. 15 defines serious harm as (a) the death penalty or execution, (b) 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of 
origin or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict.82 
Refugee and subsidiary protection apply regardless whether the actor 
of persecution or serious harm is “(a) the State, (b) parties or organisations 
controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State or (c) 
non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors mentioned in (a) 
and (b), including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to 
provide protection against persecution or serious harm [...].”83 
The Qualification Directive further determines the content of the 
international protection, including the principle of non-refoulement, the 
issuance of a residence permit and access to employment, education, health 
care and social assistance.84 Generally speaking, the rights attached to the 
 
81 Art. 2 (e) Qualification Directive. Similarly Art. 2 (f) Recast Qualification Directive. 
Art. 17 Qualification Directive is comparable to Art. 12 but slightly broader; Battjes, 
supra note 25, 264. 
82 Similarly Art. 15 Recast Qualification Directive. The Court of Justice has ruled that 
“the word ‘individual’ must be understood as covering harm to civilians irrespective 
of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed 
conflict taking place […] reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown 
for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to 
the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that 
country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred in 
Article 15(c) of the Directive.” (Case 465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie 
(Netherlands), [2009] ECR, I-921, para. 35. This is conform with the case-law of the 
ECHR, which has accepted that in the most extreme cases of general violence, there 
may be a real risk of ill-treatment (in the sense of Art. 3 ECHR) simply by virtue of 
exposing an individual to such violence. See NA v. The United Kingdom, ECHR 
(2008), Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 115. 
83 Art. 6 Qualification Directive. Similarly Art. 6 Recast Qualification Directive. 
84 Art. 20-34 Qualification Directive. 
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refugee status are more elaborate than those attached to the subsidiary 
protection status.85 
2. Other Instruments 
Other important EU asylum instruments are the Asylum Procedures 
Directive,86 the Reception Conditions Directive87 and the Dublin II 
Regulation.88 While the latter will be discussed extensively in the next 
chapter, the first two need some further elaboration here. 
The Asylum Procedures Directive lays down minimum standards for 
the granting and withdrawing of refugee status.89 It applies to all asylum 
applications made in the territory, including at the border or in the transit 
zones of a Member State, as well as to the withdrawal of refugee status.90 
The Directive generally guarantees a right of access to an asylum procedure 
and the right to remain in the Member State until a first instance decision 
 
85 The Recast Qualification Directive approximates the rights of refugees and of 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, but continues differentiation between these 
statuses with respect to residence permits (Art. 24 Recast Qualification Directive) and 
access to social welfare (Art. 29 Recast Qualification Directive) and integration 
facilities (Art. 34 Recast Qualification Directive). 
86 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Asylum 
Procedures Directive). 
87 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers (Reception Conditions Directive). 
88 Council Regulation 2003/343/EC of 18 February 2003, (OJ 2003 L 050) establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national (Dublin II Regulation). 
89 On this Directive, see elaborately Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 367-452. 
90 Art. 3 para. 1 Asylum Procedures Directive. Art. 35 however contains the possibility 
of derogating from a high number of guarantees with respect to procedures at the 
border or in transit zones. The Directive does not concern subsidiary protection 
procedures, unless when Member States apply a single procedure for refugee claims 
and claims for subsidiary protection (Art. 3 para. 3 and Peers & Rogers, supra note 
74, 367. The Commission Proposal for a recast of the Directive however does cover 
all procedures for granting and withdrawing of international protection status (see: 
Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status 
(Recast), COM(2011) 319 final). 
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has been made.91 It contains a number of procedural guarantees92 and 
minimum requirements for the decision-making process.93 Applicants must 
enjoy the right to an effective remedy before a court or a tribunal against 
decisions on their asylum application.94 The Directive further contains 
common standards and practices related to the rejection of asylum 
applications: it enumerates the grounds on which applications can be 
declared inadmissible95 or (manifestly) ill-founded96 and makes provision 
for the use of accelerated procedures in these cases.97 Applications can inter 
alia be declared inadmissible when a Member State is not responsible in 
accordance with the Dublin II Regulation98 or when a country which is not a 
Member State is considered as a “first country of asylum”99 or as a “safe 
third country”.100 
The Reception Conditions Directive in turn lays down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States.101 The 
Directive applies to all third country nationals and stateless persons who 
make an application for asylum at the border or in the territory of a Member 
State, but only as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory as 
asylum seekers.102 The Directive grants asylum seekers the right to obtain 
 
91 Art. 6 and 7 Asylum Procedures Directive. The Directive allows an exception on the 
right to remain in the case of a subsequent application which will not be examined or 
in cases of extradition (Art. 7 para. 2). 
92 Such as a right to information about procedures (Art. 10) , the opportunity of a 
personal interview (Art. 12); the right to legal assistance and representation (Art. 
15).and specific guarantees for unaccompanied minors (Art. 17). 
93 E.g. decisions are taken individually, objectively and impartially (Art. 8 para. 2, a)), 
are given in writing (Art. 9 para. 1) and, in case of rejection, state the reasons in fact 
and in law as well as written information on how to challenge a negative decision 
(Art. 9 para. 2). 
94 Art. 39 Asylum Procedures Directive. The fact that the Directive allows for non-
suspensive appeals is incompatible with Art. 13 ECHR (Peers & Rogers, supra note 
74, 408.). 
95 Art. 25 Asylum Procedures Directive. 
96 Art. 28 Asylum Procedures Directive. 
97 Art. 23 para. 4 Asylum Procedures Directive. 
98 Art. 25 para. 1 Asylum Procedures Directive. 
99 Art. 25 para. 2, b) and Art. 26 Asylum Procedures Directive. 
100 Art. 25 para. 2, c) and Art. 27 Asylum Procedures Directive. Unnecessary to say that 
these last two concepts entail the risk of indirect refoulement (see below). 
101 On this Directive, see Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 297-322. 
102 Art. 3 para. 1 Reception Conditions Directive. The Directive does not apply to 
applicants for subsidiary protection, but Art. 3 para. 4 however allows states to decide 
to apply the Directive in connection with procedures for deciding on applications for 
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documentation and to principally move freely within the territory of the host 
Member State.103 It generally requires Member States to make provisions on 
material reception conditions – such as housing, food, clothing or financial 
allowances104 – to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of 
applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence.105 The Member States 
must ensure that applicants receive the necessary health care106 and that 
asylum seeking minors and minor children of asylum seekers have access to 
the education system under similar conditions as nationals of the host 
Member State.107 The Directive allows for access, under restrictive 
conditions, to the labour market and to vocational training.108 It also 
contains specific provisions concerning persons with special needs, such as 
minors, unaccompanied minors and victims of torture and violence.109 
While the Reception Conditions Directive essentially is a 
humanitarian instrument, its underlying aim is to discourage asylum seekers 
from moving from one Member State to another: the harmonization of 
reception conditions should help to limit the secondary movements of 
asylum seekers within the EU influenced by the variety in the level of 
reception conditions in the diverse Member States.110 In Da Lomba’s words, 
“the need to ensure respect for human dignity was balanced against the 
 
kinds of protection other than that emanating from the Geneva Convention. The 
Commission proposal for a recast of the Reception Conditions Directive however does 
cover all applicants for international protection (see Art. 3 Amended proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers (Recast), COM(2011) 320 final. 
103 Art. 6 and 7 Reception Conditions Directive. The freedom of movement is however 
far from absolute, see below chapter F. 
104 Art. 2 (j) defines “material reception conditions” as “the reception conditions that 
include housing, food and clothing, provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in 
vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance.” 
105 Art. 13 para. 2. Art. 14 deals with the modalities for material reception conditions. 
106 Art. 15 para. 1 Reception Conditions Directive. This must at least include emergency 
care and essential treatment of illness. 
107 Art. 10, para. 1 Reception Conditions Directive. 
108 Art. 11 and Art. 12 Reception Conditions Directive. 
109 Respectively Art. 18, Art. 19 and Art. 20 Reception Conditions Directive. 
110 Consideration 8 Reception Conditions Directive. According to Peers & Rogers, there 
is however “little or no evidence that secondary movements are made on this basis” 
(Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 306.) similar consideration was made at the drafting 
of the Asylum Procedures Directive, see Consideration 6 Asylum Procedures 
Directive. 
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overall restrictive objectives of the EU asylum policy as well as financial 
considerations.”111 
As both the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception 
Conditions Directive lay down minimum standards, Member States are 
explicitly allowed to maintain or introduce more favourable conditions, 
insofar as these are compatible with the respective directive.112 
D. Dublin II Regulation 
I. Content Regulation 
The so-called Dublin II Regulation, named after the preceding Dublin 
Convention,113 contains a hierarchical list of criteria to determine which EU 
Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.114 The 
objective of the Regulation is to avoid “asylum shopping”, i.e. the lodging 
of asylum applications in several Member States or the travelling to a 
preferred Member State to apply for asylum after transiting other States.115 
The criteria must be applied in the order in which they are set out in the 
Regulation.116 
 
111 Da Lomba, supra note 28, 220. 
112 Art. 5 Asylum Procedures Directive and Art. 4 Reception Conditions Directive.  
113 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, Dublin, 15 June 
1990. On this Regulation, see Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 221-257. 
114 Applicants for subsidiary protection are not included in the Dublin II Regulation, 
which predates the Qualification Directive. The Commission Proposal for a recast of 
the Dublin II Regulation however encompasses every application for international 
protection (Art. 1 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person 
(Recast) (Commission Proposal Dublin II), Com(2008) 820 final/2). The Regulation 
applies to the 27 EU Member States as well as to Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein. 
115 Battjes, supra note 25, 27. 
116 Art. 5 para. 1 Dublin II Regulation. 
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A first set of criteria is related to reasons of family reunification.117 A 
second set of criteria relates to the issuance of residence permits or visas.118 
The most well-known criterion is that of the country where the asylum 
seeker has irregularly entered the European Union.119 Subsequent criteria 
relate to a third-country national entering the territory of a Member State in 
which the need for him or her to have a visa is waived.120 and to the 
application made at the international transit area of an airport of a Member 
State,121 in both instances that Member State shall be responsible. When no 
Member State can be designated on the basis of these criteria, the first 
Member State with which the application was lodged shall be responsible.122 
With the exception of the criteria related to family reunification, the Dublin 
system is thus designed to allocate responsibility to that Member State 
which has played the most important part in the entry of the asylum seeker 
concerned.123 
Regardless of these criteria, the Member State where the asylum 
application is lodged can decide on the basis of the so-called “sovereignty 
clause” to examine the application124. Moreover any Member State may, at 
the request of another Member State, accept to examine an application on 
humanitarian grounds based in particular on family or cultural 
considerations, on condition that the persons concerned consent125. 
The Regulation provides that the designated Member State is obliged 
to “take charge of” an asylum seeker who has lodged an application in a 
different Member State or to “take back” an applicant who already lodged 
an application in the designated Member State, which is under examination, 
has been withdrawn by the applicant or has been rejected.126 The Regulation 
further specifies the procedure for the submission of and the response to 
 
117 Art. 6-8 Dublin II Regulation. These criteria have been criticized for defining the 
concept of family too narrowly, in line with the western concept of the nuclear family 
(e.g. Da Lomba, supra note 28, 122.). 
118 Art. 9 Dublin II Regulation. 
119 Art. 10 para. 1 Dublin II Regulation. 
120 Art. 11 Dublin II Regulation. 
121 Art. 12 Dublin II Regulation. 
122 Art. 13 Dublin II Regulation. 
123 Da Lomba, supra note 28, 119. 
124 Art. 3 para. 2 Dublin II Regulation. 
125 Art. 15 para. 1 Dublin II Regulation. 
126 Art. 16 para. 1 Dublin II Regulation. 
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“take charge” or “take back” requests, including strict time limits, and the 
“transfer” to the designated Member State.127 
II. Criticism 
The Dublin II Regulation has been widely criticised for failing to 
adequately protect asylum seekers’ fundamental rights.128 According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “a basic 
assumption underlying the Dublin system is not yet fulfilled – namely, the 
premise that asylum-seekers are able to enjoy generally equivalent levels of 
procedural and substantive protection, pursuant to harmonized laws and 
practices, in all Member States.”129 This fact has led to the result that “many 
individuals transferred under Dublin do not have their claims properly 
considered or may even be denied access to a procedure altogether.”130 The 
huge differences in success rates of asylum applications in different 
Member States have been correctly labelled as an “asylum lottery”.131 There 
 
127 Art. 17-20 Dublin II Regulation. 
128 E.g. M. Kengerlinsky, ‘Shifting Borders: Immigration, Refugee and Asylum Matters 
& Public Policy: Immigration and Asylum Policies in the European Union and the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Questioning the legality of restrictions’, 12 
Georgetown Public Policy Review (2006-2007), 101, 110. 
129 ‘UNHCR Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third 
country national or a stateless person (Dublin II) (Com(2008) 820, 3 December 2008) 
and the European Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ 
for a comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [the Dublin II] 
Regulation] (COM(2008) 825, 3 December 2008)’, 1-2 (March 2009) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&query=COM%282008%
29+825%2C+3+December+2008&x=0&y=0 (last visited 2 May 2012). According to 
the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), “[t]he Dublin II Regulation is 
based on an erroneous presumption that an asylum seeker will receive equivalent 
access to protection in whichever Member State a claim is lodged” (ECRE, ‘Report on 
the Application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe’, 169 (March 2006) available at 
http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/57-policy-papers/135-report-on-the-ap
plication-of-the-dublin-ii-regulation-in-europe.html (last visited 2 May 2012) [ECRE 
Report]. 
130 Id. 
131 ECRE, ‘Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin 
Reconsidered’, 15 (March 2008) available at http://www.ecre.org/component/content/
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equally exists a great divergence in the level of reception conditions in the 
different Member States.132 The Regulation has also been criticized for 
being an incentive for States to resort to an increased use of detention in 
order to secure Dublin II transfers.133 
The fact that entry controls are linked to the allocation of 
responsibility under the Dublin II Regulation, has been criticized for 
creating unequal burdens depending on a State’s geographical location.134 
This is contrary to Art. 80 TFEU, which states that “[t]he policies of the 
Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member States.”135  
Moreover, while “efficiency” appears to be one of the primary 
objectives of the Dublin II Regulation, its operation is inefficient, expensive 
and time-consuming.136 It does not achieve its goal of reducing the number 
of multiple applications.137 According to the European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles (ECRE), “[a]t best, the Dublin Regulation adds a lengthy, 
cumbersome procedure to the beginning of the asylum process.”138 This 
lengthy process, with its numerous deadlines, unnecessarily prolongs the 
 
article/57-policy-papers/134-sharing-responsibility-for-refugee-protection-in-europe-d
ublin-reconsidered.html (last visited 2 May 2012) [ECRE Responsibility]. 
132 Amnesty International, ‘The Dublin II Trap’ (March 2010) available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR25/001/2010/en, 35-41 (last visited 2 
May 2012). 
133 ECRE Report, 169. See below, chapter F, III, 2. 
134 E.g. Da Lomba, supra note 28, 137; ECRE Report, 169. While in practice the majority 
of the actual transfers are not directed towards Member States located at an external 
border (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the evaluation of the Dublin system, 6 June 2007, COM(2007) 299 final), the proper 
operation of the Dublin system would lead to a significant increase in the number of 
applicants in certain border countries (European Parliament’s Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the evaluation of the Dublin system, 2 
July 2008, A6-0287/2008, 12). 
135 The old Art. 63, para. 2, (b) Treaty establishing the European Community strove to “a 
balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of 
receiving refugees and displaced persons.” 
136 ECRE Responsibility, 10.In reality few transfers are actually agreed on and more than 
half of the agreed transfers never happen. See similarly the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the evaluation of 
the Dublin system, 2 July 2008, A6-0287/2008. 
137 ECRE Responsibility, 11.  
138 Id. 
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State of uncertainty in which asylum seekers find themselves and 
unnecessarily delays refugees’ integration in the host country.139 
Unsurprisingly, some have therefore argued that it might be better to 
do away with the Dublin system altogether.140 In the opponents’ view, it 
would be better to allow asylum seekers the freedom to choose in which 
Member State they lodge an asylum application141 – Member States 
receiving disproportionately high numbers of asylum seekers would then be 
compensated by a financial burden sharing instrument.142 This would be 
more in line with the freedom of movement, a fundamental principle of EU 
law,143 as it does not compel asylum seekers to apply in a Member State not 
of their choosing.144 Others have argued in favour of a system in which an 
asylum application is first examined by an EU body, instead of an individual 
Member State.145 In the case of a positive decision, a refugee would then be 
distributed over the Member States on a quota basis. 
III. European Court of Human Rights 
On 21 January 2011, the European Court of Human Rights issued the 
long-anticipated Grand Chamber judgment in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece. The case concerned an Afghan asylum seeker who was 
transferred by Belgium to Greece in application of the Dublin II Regulation. 
At his arrival in Greece, he was placed in detention for three days. After his 
release he had to live on the streets, without accommodation or means of 
 
139 Id., 26. 
140 ECRE Report, 170. 
141 ECRE Responsibility, 29-30.As an alternative, ECRE proposes the use of criteria 
which indicate a significant connection of an asylum seeker with a particular Member 
State. 
142 ECRE Report, 170. 
143 Art. 45 Charter and Art. 3 para. 2 TEU. 
144 ECRE Responsibility, 7. 
145 C. Clarke, ‘The EU and migration: A call for action’ (1 December 2011) available at 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/essay/2011/eu-and-migration-call-action, 
18 (last visited 2 May 2012); ‘UNHCR Working Paper A Revised “EU Prong” 
Proposal’ (22 December 2003) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/400e
85b84.html (last visited 2 May 2012). Such a system, or even worse, a system of 
processing in centers outside the EU (see M. Garlick, ‘The EU Discussions on 
Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum?’, 18 International Journal of 
Refugee Law (2006) 3-4, 601-629, is however contrary to the need for integration of 
refugees from day one (ECRE Responsibility, 27).  
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survival. Later he was detained for seven more days, after a failed attempt to 
leave Greece, after which he was again abandoned to live on the streets. 
One of the applicant’s complaints concerned his “indirect 
refoulement” by Belgium. As explained above, Art. 3 ECHR prohibits the 
expulsion of a person to a country where he or she runs a real risk of being 
subjected to torture or to an inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
In the case of T.I. v. The United Kingdom, the Court had already ruled that 
“the indirect removal […] to an intermediary country […] does not affect 
the responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not, 
as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 
of the Convention.”146 Therefore, when they apply the Dublin Regulation, 
“the States must make sure that the intermediary country’s asylum 
procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum seeker being 
removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without any 
evaluation of the risks he faces from the standpoint of Article 3 of the 
Convention.”147 As States can refrain from transferring asylum seekers to 
the designated Member State on the basis of the “sovereignty clause”, such 
a transfer does not strictly fall within their international legal obligations 
and therefore the Bosphorus-presumption does not apply.148 
In the earlier case of K.R.S. v. The United Kingdom, concerning the 
Dublin II transfer of an Iranian asylum seekers from the United Kingdom to 
Greece, the Court had stated that “in the absence of any proof to the 
contrary, it must be presumed that Greece will comply with [Art. 3 ECHR] 
in respect of returnees including the applicant.”149 In light of the numerous 
reports issued in recent years regarding the deficiencies of the asylum 
procedure in Greece, the Court adopted the different view in M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece that:  
 
“it was in fact up to the Belgian authorities, faced with the 
situation described above, not merely to assume that the 
applicant would be treated in conformity with the Convention 
standards but, on the contrary, to first verify how the Greek 
authorities applied their legislation on asylum in practice. Had 
they done this, they would have seen that the risks the applicant 
 
146 T.I. v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2000), Appl. No. 43844/98. 
147 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECHR(2011), Appl. No. 30696/09, para. 342. 
148 Id., para. 339-340. 
149 K.R.S. v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2008), Appl. No. 32733/08. 
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faced were real and individual enough to fall within the scope of 
Article 3.”150  
 
Therefore the Court ruled that Belgium had violated Art. 3 ECHR by 
transferring the applicant to Greece.151 The Court found a further violation 
of Art. 3 ECHR by Belgium, because the transfer had knowingly exposed 
the applicant to detention and living conditions that amounted to degrading 
treatment.152 
This ruling more or less implies the end of mutual trust in European 
Asylum Law: transferring States should not just presume that other Member 
States comply with their international obligations. When an issue arises 
under Art. 3 ECHR, they are obliged to apply the “sovereignty clause”. 
IV. Recast Regulation 
The concern about the capacity of countries like Greece to comply 
with European minimum standards on asylum procedures and reception 
conditions is reflected in the 2008 Commission proposal to recast the Dublin 
II Regulation. The proposal contains a procedure which will allow the 
Commission – on its own initiative or on the initiative of another Member 
State – to suspend the Dublin II transfers to a Member State when 
“circumstances prevailing in [the Member State concerned] may lead to a 
level of protection for applicants for international protection which is not in 
conformity with Community legislation, in particular with [the Reception 
Conditions Directive] and [the Asylum Procedures Directive].”153 The 
proposal further provides that a Member State may request the Commission 
to temporarily suspend incoming Dublin II transfers when faced with “a 
particularly urgent situation which places an exceptionally heavy burden on 
its reception capacities, asylum system or infrastructure, and when the 
transfer of applicants for international protection in accordance with this 
Regulation to that Member State could add to that burden.”154 The 
 
150 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 30696/09, para. 359. 
151 Id., para. 360. 
152 Id., para. 367-368. The transfer of M.S.S. equally violated Art. 4 (the prohibition of 
torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and Art. 19 para. 2 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, both with respect to the risk of indirect 
refoulement as with respect to the exposure to inhuman and degrading detention and 
living circumstances.  
153 Art. 31 para. 2-3, Commission Proposal Dublin II. 
154 Art. 31 para. 1 Commission Proposal Dublin II. 
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Commission proposal has been slightly amended by the European 
Parliament155 and is currently being discussed by the Council. 
 
In the Council, however, there is fierce opposition to the idea of a 
suspension mechanism,156 which makes it highly likely that the proposal 
will eventually be dropped. The Polish presidency has even made a 
counterproposal to instead introduce an “early warning system”, which will 
allow the Commission to make recommendations to a Member State, 
inviting it to draw up a “preventive action plan” in case it identifies 
problems in the application of that Member States’ asylum system.157 If that 
“preventive action plan” does not lead to an improvement, the Commission, 
in cooperation with the Member State concerned, may elaborate a “crisis 
management action plan”. The Member State concerned will have to submit 
regular reports on the implementation of these plans. 
While it is unclear at this moment whether Poland’s proposal will be 
endorsed by the Council, it is likely that the final version of the recast 
Dublin II Regulation will not contain a strong mechanism in order to avoid 
asylum seekers being transferred to Member States where they risk indirect 
refoulement or inhuman or degrading detention and living circumstances. 
As the M.S.S. judgment makes clear that such a transfer is prohibited, a 
strong mechanism is highly feasible because it would allow the EU 
institutions to monitor whether the basic assumption of the Dublin II system 
– that the receiving Member State offers asylum seekers a sufficient level of 
human rights protection – is fulfilled in practice. It is in any event clear that 
the current powers of the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings 
before the Court of Justice against a Member State which fails to comply 
with European law158 are insufficient.159 
 
155 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 7 May 2009 with a 
view to the adoption of Regulation (EC) No …/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ 
C 5 August 2010, No. 212, E/371. 
156 See e.g. Council Discussion Paper No. 15561/10, 29 October 2010. 
157 Council Discussion Paper No. 16782/11, 14 November 2011. 
158 As provided for by Art. 258 TFEU. 
159 The Commission has initiated proceedings against Member States for failure to 
respect the transposition deadline of the Reception Conditions Directive and the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, but never for a failure to respect the minimum 
standards themselves. 
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The lack of a strong mechanism is particularly problematic in the light 
of the upcoming accession of the EU to the ECHR: the case-law of the 
ECtHR shows that the international responsibility of a State under the 
ECHR is engaged when domestic law makes lawful a treatment which 
breaches a Convention right.160 In the future, it can therefore equally be 
argued that the EU is internationally responsible for a Dublin transfer by 
one Member State to another, in violation of the ECHR, because EU law 
makes such transfers lawful without however providing sufficient 
safeguards to prevent a violation of the human rights of asylum seekers. 
E. Reception Conditions 
A second interesting aspect of the M.S.S. judgment from the viewpoint 
of European Asylum Law is the applicant’s complaint about his living 
circumstances in Greece. It should first be noted that the Court, as a body 
supervising a civil and political rights instrument, is generally quite 
reluctant to enter the sphere of social and economic rights.161 The Court has 
however held that “the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention 
may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a 
decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention.”162 
Sometimes socio-economic interests can be protected from the angle of 
“negative” obligations – i.e. obligations of the State authorities not to 
interfere arbitrarily with Convention rights – for example the protection 
against eviction of a family from a Romani caravan site.163 The main 
potential for the Court to enhance the protection of human rights in the 
socio-economic sphere, however lies in the doctrine of “positive” 
 
160 E.g. Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1981), Appl. Nos 
7601/76 and 7806/77, para. 49; VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, ECHR 
(2001), Appl. No. 24699/94,, para. 47; Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 
ECHR (2008), Appl. No. 23883/06, para. 34. 
161 E.g. E. Palmer, ‘Protecting Socio-Economic Rights through the European Convention 
on Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 2 Erasmus Law Review (2009) 4, 397-425. 
162 Airey v. Ireland, ECHR (1979), Appl. No. 6289/73, para. 26. See also Sidabras and 
Džiautas v. Lithuania, ECHR, (2004), Appl. Nos 55480/00 and 59330/00, para. 47. 
163 Connors v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2004), Appl. No. 66746/01.  
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obligations.164 These types of obligations necessitate that States actively 
protect and fulfil165 Convention rights. 
So far, the Court has refused to read extensive positive obligations in 
the socio-economic sphere into the Convention. The Court has for example 
stated that: 
 
“Article 8 does not in terms recognise a right to be provided 
with a home. Nor does any of the jurisprudence of the Court 
acknowledge such a right. While it is clearly desirable that every 
human being [has] a place where he or she can live in dignity 
and which he or she can call home, there are unfortunately in the 
Contracting States many persons who have no home. Whether 
the State provides funds to enable everyone to have a home is a 
matter for political not judicial decision.”166 
 
The Court nonetheless does not exclude that a refusal to solve the 
housing problem of an individual suffering from a severe disease might in 
certain circumstances raise an issue under Art. 8 ECHR, because of the 
impact of such refusal on the private life of the individual.167 In the case of 
Müslim v. Turkey, the Court has also held that Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 3 
ECHR do not oblige Member States to give refugees financial assistance to 
enable them to maintain a certain standard of living.168 
The Grand Chamber, however, distinguishes the case of M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece from the Court’s earlier case law. Because “the 
obligation to provide accommodation and decent material conditions has 
now entered into positive law and the Greek authorities are bound to comply 
with their own legislation, which transposes Community law, namely [the 
Reception Conditions Directive]”169 and because asylum seekers are a 
 
164 This doctrine was first applied in Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR (1979), Appl. No. 
6833/74, in which the Court stated that Art. 8 ECHR, the right to respect for family 
life, “does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition 
to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective ‘respect’ for family life” (para. 31). 
165 The distinction between obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill stems from the 
work of Asbjørn Eide; The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, Report 
prepared by Mr. A. Eide, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23. 
166 Chapman v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2001), Appl. No. 27238/95, para. 99. 
167 Marzari v. Italy, ECHR (1999), Appl. No. 36448/97. 
168 Müslim v. Turkey, ECHR (2005), Appl. No. 53566/99, para. 85. 
169 Id., para. 250. 
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particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of 
special protection,170 the Court ruled that “the Greek authorities must be 
held responsible, because of their inaction, for the situation in which [the 
applicant] has found himself for several months, living in the street, with no 
resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of 
providing for his essential needs”171 and that Greece thereby violated Art. 3 
ECHR.172 
The subsequent case of Rahimi v. Greece concerned the lack of care 
for a 15 year old Afghan unaccompanied minor. At arrival in Greece, he 
was placed in detention for two days, after which he was abandoned to live 
on the streets. The Court recalled the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and 
Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium in which it stated that unaccompanied minors 
can be considered to belong to a “class of highly vulnerable members of 
society to whom the […] State owed a duty to take adequate measures to 
provide care and protection as part of its positive obligations under Article 3 
of the Convention.”173 The Court particularly emphasized the fact that the 
Greek authorities had neglected to appoint a legal guardian, although this 
was required by Greek law, in transposition of the Reception Conditions 
Directive.174 The Court further attached importance to the lack of shelter 
and support, recalling the findings of the M.S.S. judgment.175 Therefore the 
Court concluded that there had been a violation of Art. 3 ECHR.176 
In both cases, the Court has attributed decisive power to the 
obligations under the Reception Conditions Directive in finding a violation 
of Art. 3 ECHR. This is confirmed by Judge Rozakis in his concurring 
opinion to the M.S.S. judgment, in which he states that “[t]he existence of 
those international obligations of Greece – and notably, vis-à-vis the 
European Union – to treat asylum seekers in conformity with these 
requirements weighed heavily in the Court's decision to find a violation of 
Article 3.”  
In the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the applicant was found 
to be in a situation which was incompatible with Art. 13 Reception 
 
170 Id., para. 251. 
171 Id., para. 263. 
172 Id., para. 264. 
173 Rahimi v. Greece, ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 8687/08, para. 87; Mubilanzila Mayeka 
and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, ECHR (2006), Appl. No. 13178/03, para. 55. 
174 Rahimi v. Greece, ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 8687/08, para. 88. 
175 Id., para. 90-93. 
176 Id., para. 94. 
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Conditions Directive, which generally requires that “Member States shall 
make provisions on material reception conditions to ensure a standard of 
living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their 
subsistence.”177 The applicant’s situation in Rahimi v. Greece was in turn 
incompatible with Art. 19 Reception Conditions Directive, which requires 
that “Member States shall as soon as possible take measures to ensure the 
necessary representation of unaccompanied minors by legal guardianship or, 
where necessary, representation by an organisation which is responsible for 
the care and well-being of minors, or by any other appropriate 
representation.”178  
By attributing decisive power to the obligations under the Reception 
Conditions Directive, the ECtHR strengthens the impact of this instrument. 
Invoking Art. 3 ECHR may be a good substitute for directly invoking the 
provisions of (the domestic legislation implementing) the Reception 
Conditions Directive. Firstly the Court does not appear to require that the 
authorities’ inaction breaches the Reception Conditions Directive in the 
strictest sense. It is sufficient that the situation of an asylum seeker reaches 
the minimum level of severity required by Art. 3 ECHR and that this results 
from an inaction on the part of the authorities which can be linked to one of 
the obligations under the Reception Conditions Directive. Secondly, Art. 3 
ECHR constitutes a subjective right, while this might not be the case for the 
provisions of (the domestic legislation implementing) the Reception 
Conditions Directive. In this respect it is necessary to mention the case-law 
of the Court of Justice concerning the direct effect of directives: an 
individual can only invoke the provisions of a directive which has not been 
transposed at the expiry of the transposition deadline or which have not 
been transposed correctly, in so far as these provisions are unconditional 
and sufficiently precise.179 
A more fundamental issue is whether one can really maintain that the 
scope of Art. 3 ECHR is defined by obligations under the Reception 
Conditions Directive. The question of whether a State has violated a 
preventive positive obligation under Art. 3 ECHR generally depends on 
 
177 Art. 13 para. 2 Reception Conditions Directive. 
178 Art. 19 para. 1 Reception Conditions Directive. 
179 E.g. Court of Justice, 28 April 2011, no. C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, para. 46. In Peers’ 
and Rogers’ view, the guarantees for asylum seekers in the Reception Conditions 
Directive meet the conditions for direct effect (Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 303). 
In the absence of an explicit ruling of the Court of Justice in this sense, invoking Art. 
3 ECHR will however avoid the potential direct effect pitfall. 
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whether or not the authorities concerned took “reasonable steps” to prevent 
ill-treatment of which they “had or had to have had knowledge”.180 The 
State thus only has to provide justification for an alleged lack of such 
“reasonable steps”, insofar as a situation comes within the scope of Art. 3 
ECHR or not. This solely depends on whether the required “minimum level 
of severity” was attained or not.181 The legality of a situation is irrelevant 
for determining whether or not that situation comes within the scope of Art. 
3 ECHR – to hold otherwise would allow States themselves to determine the 
minimum level of human rights protection, which is contrary to the counter-
majoritarian function of human rights.  
The correct starting point of the Court’s analysis should thus have 
been to establish that the situations of M.S.S. and Rahimi attained the 
“minimum level of severity”. The subsequent step would have been to rule 
that by failing to comply with its obligations under the Reception 
Conditions Directive,182 the Greek authorities had not taken “reasonable 
steps” to remedy the situations of M.S.S. and Rahimi of which they had been 
well aware. This implies that the situation of extreme destitution in which 
asylum seekers sometimes find themselves – regardless of whether this 
situation is lawful under European law or not – can reach the threshold of 
Art. 3 ECHR. Similarly, such a situation may be in violation of Art. 4 of the 
Charter, which equally prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment and has the same meaning and scope of Art. 3 ECHR.183 It 
can thus be examined whether the Reception Conditions Directive is 
compatible with Art. 3 ECHR and Art. 4 of the Charter – this would always 
be the case if the scope of these provisions would depend on the content of 
the Reception Conditions Directive, which makes no sense whatsoever. 
When the recast version of the Reception Conditions Directive is 
adopted, the Court of Justice may be called upon to examine in abstracto 
 
180 E.g. Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2001), Appl. No. 29392/95, para. 
73. 
181 E.g. Gäfgen v. Germany, ECHR (2010), Appl. No. 22978/05, para. 88. 
182 Such an approach would be comparable with the one the Court takes in environmental 
cases under Art. 8 ECHR. In these cases the Court generally finds a violation of the 
State’s positive obligations under Art. 8 ECHR when the domestic authorities fail to 
comply with or to enforce domestic environmental legislation (e.g. Fadeyeva v. 
Russia, ECHR (2005), Appl. No. 55723/00, para. 97). The failure to comply with 
domestic law is essentially problematic from the viewpoint of the rule of law, an 
important underlying principle of the ECHR (e.g. Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR 
(2004), Appl. No. 31443/96, para. 184). 
183 Explanations relating to the Charter, 18. 
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whether it provides sufficient protection against potential inhuman or 
degrading living circumstances. For example, Peers and Rogers have argued 
that the exclusion from the scope of the Reception Conditions Directive of 
persons whose asylum application has been rejected but who have not been 
expelled may be incompatible with Art. 3 ECHR if these persons are 
thereby left in a situation of destitution.184 Similarly, the Court may examine 
whether the restrictive conditions to which certain guarantees of the 
Reception Conditions Directive are subjected are compatible with Art. 3 
ECHR. 
F. Detention of Asylum Seekers 
I. Arbitrary Detention 
Art. 9 para. 1 ICCPR explicitly and Art. 5 para. 1 ECHR implicitly 
prohibit arbitrary detention. The latter is acknowledged in the case law of 
the ECtHR: “any measure depriving the individual of his liberty must be 
compatible with the purpose of Article 5 (art. 5), namely to protect the 
individual from arbitrariness.”185 The notion of “arbitrariness” inter alia 
prohibits the granting of absolute discretion to a single authority or the 
discriminatory use of detention, and is linked to ethical standards such as 
justice and reasonableness.186 The aim of this notion is the maximization of 
personal liberty,187 which is clearly illustrated by the structure of both Art. 9 
para. 1 ICCPR and Art. 5 para. 1 ECHR, which both primarily and 
principally guarantee a right to personal liberty and only secondarily and 
restrictively allow for deprivation of liberty. In Marcoux’s words, 
therefore,“[t]he more a law operates to deprive individuals of the right to 
personal liberty, the more such a law becomes arbitrary. At the same time, 
the state has a correspondingly greater duty to justify its actions.”188 This 
justification requires reference to certain universally recognized goal values 
and the use of necessity and proportionality arguments.189 Necessity which 
 
184 Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 304-305. 
185 E.g. Bozano v. France, ECHR (1986), Appl. No. 9990/82, para. 54. 
186 L. Marcoux, ‘Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Under International 
Law’, 5 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review (1982) 2, 345, 370-
371. 
187 Id., 369. 
188 Id, 374. 
189 Id.  
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is thus directly connected to the prohibition of arbitrariness generally 
requires the use of the least intrusive means to achieve a certain legitimate 
aim.190 Detention without considering the least intrusive means is thus 
unnecessary and arbitrary.191 With respect to the detention of asylum 
seekers, this is clearly established in the case-law of the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) and slowly emerging in the case-law of the ECtHR. 
II. Asylum Detention 
Art. 5 para. 1, f) ECHR allows “the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country.” The 
meaning of this provision was clarified by the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR in the case of Saadi v. The United Kingdom. The case concerned an 
Iraqi Kurd who had lodged an asylum application upon arrival at London-
Heathrow airport, but who was subsequently detained for seven days in a 
special facility for asylum seekers. According to the Court any entry is 
“unauthorised” until a State has authorised it and the Court “does not accept 
that, as soon as an asylum seeker has surrendered himself to the immigration 
authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, with the result that 
detention cannot be justified under the first limb of Article 5 para. 1 (f).”192 
The Court thereby permits the detention of asylum seekers “in certain 
 
190 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002), 66. 
191 In a comment to the Saadi judgment, O’Nions argues that “necessity” cannot be 
separated from “arbitrariness” and “proportionality” and that it is impossible to 
conceive of these concepts in isolation, H. O’Nions, ‘No Right to Liberty: the 
Detention of Asylum Seekers for Administrative Convenience’, 10 European Journal 
of Migration and Law (2008) 2, 149, 181 and 184. Similarly, G. Cornelisse, ‘Human 
Rights for Immigration Detainees in Strasbourg: Limited Sovereignty or a Limited 
Discourse?’, 6 European Journal of Migration and Law (2004) 2, 93, 108-109. 
192 Saadi v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2008), Appl. No. 13229/03, para. 65. This was 
criticized by Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Kovler, Hajiyev, Spielmann and Hirvelä in 
their dissenting opinion. In their view, “asylum seekers who have presented a claim 
for international protection are ipso facto lawfully within the territory of a State.” 
Therefore the first limb of Art. 5, para. 1, f) cannot be applied to asylum seekers, as 
the aim of this provision is “to prevent illegal immigration, that is, entry into or 
residence in a country based on circumvention of the immigration control 
procedures.” In the dissenters’ view, the majority thus unjustifiably assimilated the 
situation of asylum seekers to that of ordinary immigrants. 
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circumstances, for example while identity checks are taking place or when 
elements on which the asylum claim is based have to be determined.”193 
The ECtHR does not require such detention to be “reasonably 
considered necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from 
committing an offence or fleeing”,194 it must however be “carried out in 
good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of 
detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is 
applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens 
who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the 
length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the 
purpose pursued.”195 
Recent case law however suggests that some Sections of the Court are 
slowly moving away from the Grand Chamber’s rejection in Saadi of a 
necessity test under Art. 5 para. 1, f).196 Such a test is accepted under most 
sub-paragraphs of Art. 5 para. 1 ECHR.197 In the case of Hilda 
Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, concerning the repeated detention of an alcohol-
intoxicated woman on the basis of Art. 5 para. 1, e),198 the Court for 
instance held that “[t]he detention of an individual is such a serious measure 
that it is only justified where other, less stringent measures have been 
considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or the 
public interest which might require that the person concerned be 
 
193 Id. In the dissenters’ view, however, detention under Art. 5, para. 1,) cannot be 
justified if it pursues “a purely bureaucratic and administrative goal, unrelated to any 
need to prevent [an] unauthorised entry into the country.” 
194 Id., paras 72-73. According to the dissenters, however, “the requirements of necessity 
and proportionality oblige the State to furnish relevant and sufficient grounds for the 
measure taken and to consider other less coercive measures, and also to give reasons 
why those measures are deemed insufficient to safeguard the private or public 
interests underlying the deprivation of liberty.” In their view, “the question of 
alternatives to detention should have been considered by the majority.” 
195 Id., para. 74. 
196 See L. Lavrysen, ‘Less stringent measures and migration detention: overruling Saadi 
v. UK?’ (25 January 2012) available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/01/25/les
s-stringent-measures-and-migration-detention-overruling-saadi-v-uk/ (last visited 2 
May 2012). 
197 See references Saadi v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2008), Appl. No. 13229/03, 
para. 70. 
198 Art. 5 para. 1, e) allows “the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the 
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants.” 
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detained.”199 As the Court made clear in Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir, the “less 
stringent measures” test (or necessity test) is linked to the requirement that 
detention can only be lawful in the absence of arbitrariness. In the cases of 
Rahimi v. Greece and Popov v. France, the Court held that the detention of a 
minor under Art. 5 para. 1, f) ECHR can only be justified insofar as it can be 
considered to be “a measure of last resort which could not be replaced by 
any other alternative.”200 This clearly resonates the requirements of Art. 37, 
b) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).201 In the case of 
Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, the Court applied a similar “less stringent 
measures” test. The Court held that the detention of an HIV-positive 
Cameroonian woman violated Art. 5 para. 1, f) ECHR, because “the 
authorities had not considered a less severe measure capable of safeguarding 
the public interest.”202 These cases show that the Court’s case law 
increasingly recognizes that the detention of asylum seekers and migrants is 
arbitrary if there are “less stringent measures” available. 
A strict necessity requirement similarly but unambiguously flows 
from the case-law of the Human Rights Committee, the monitoring body of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).203 Art. 9 
para. 1 ICCPR prohibits arbitrary detention and arrest. The HRC has stated 
that “the notion of “arbitrariness” must not be equated with “against the 
law” but be interpreted more broadly to include such elements as 
inappropriateness and injustice. Furthermore, remand in custody could be 
considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the 
case, for example to prevent flight or interference with evidence: the 
element of proportionality becomes relevant in this context.”204 According 
 
199 Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, ECHR (2004), Appl. No. 40905/98, para. 51. 
200 Originally: “une mesure de dernier ressort à laquelle aucune alternative ne pouvait se 
substituer”, see Popov v. France, ECHR (2012), Appl. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, 
para. 119, and similarly Rahimi v. Greece, ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 8687/08, 
para. 109. 
201 “No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be 
used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.” 
In Rahimi, the Court explicitly refers to Art. 37 CRC (para. 108). 
202 Originally: “les autorités n’ont pas envisagé une mesure moins sévère […] pour 
sauvegarder l’intérêt public de la détention”, see Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 
ECHR (2011), Appl. No. 10486/10, para. 124. 
203 The Court of Justice takes the ICCPR into account when applying the general 
principles of EU law, see e.g. Court of Justice, 17 February 1998, no. C-249/96, 
Grant, para. 44. 
204 HRC, 3 April 1997, no. 560/1993, A. v. Australia, para. 9.2. 
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to the HRC it is not per se arbitrary to detain individuals requesting 
asylum,205 but “detention should not continue beyond the period for which 
the State can provide appropriate justification. For example, the fact of 
illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other 
factors particular to the individuals, such as the likelihood of absconding 
and lack of cooperation, which may justify detention for a period. Without 
such factors detention may be considered arbitrary, even if entry was 
illegal.”206 The Committee therefore requires States to demonstrate “that, in 
the light of the author’s particular circumstances, there were no less invasive 
means of achieving the same ends, that is to say, compliance with the state 
party’s immigration policies, by, for example, the imposition of reporting 
obligations, sureties or other conditions […]”.207 
Art. 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in combination with the 
general limitation clause of Art. 52 para. 1, only allows limitations of the 
right to freedom insofar as these are “necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.” Although the Court of Justice has not yet 
interpreted the scope of this necessity criterion, any such interpretation 
should require that less stringent measures are considered and found to be 
insufficient to achieve a legitimate aim. 
III. EU Asylum Law 
1. General 
In the context of asylum detention, the ECtHR has clearly held that 
“there must be adequate legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary 
interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the 
Convention.”208 It is therefore not sufficient that every case of detention is 
justified in concreto the law itself should also provide protection against 
arbitrary detention in abstracto. As the European Union has gained 
important competences in the field of asylum law, the positive obligation to 
 
205 Id., para. 9.3. 
206 Id., para. 9.4. 
207 HRC, 28 October 2002, no. 900/1999, C. v. Australia, para. 8.2. See also HRC, 6 
August 2003, no. 1014/2001, Baban et al. v. Australia, para. 7.2; HRC, no. 1069/2002, 
Bakhtiyari v. Australia, para. 9.3. 
208 Amuur v. France, ECHR (1996), Appl. No. 19776/92, para. 53. 
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provide a legal framework which protects asylum seekers from arbitrary 
detention has simultaneously shifted in its direction. 
Art. 18 of the Asylum Procedures Directive requires that “Member 
States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is 
an applicant for asylum.” Although this provision expresses a generally 
negative stance towards the detention of asylum seekers,209 it does not 
provide real safeguards to properly limit Member States in their use of 
detention.210 Art. 7 Reception Conditions Directive generally protects the 
freedom of movement of asylum seekers, but para. 3 allows Member States 
“[w]hen it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of 
public order, [… to] confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance 
with their national law.” While “confinement” is not in itself defined, it is 
clear that it covers “detention”, as the notion of “detention” itself is defined 
as “confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member State within a particular 
place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of 
movement”.211  
These provisions allow for the detention of asylum seekers for a wide 
variety of reasons. Although detention is only allowed insofar as it is 
considered “necessary”, the lack of a list of limited detention grounds 
entails the risk of arbitrary use of detention. Many asylum seekers are 
simply detained on the formal basis that it is likely that they will abscond 
before the completion of the asylum procedure.212 In Peers’ and Rogers’ 
view, “[t]here is a real danger […] that in the face of having to apply certain 
minimum standards of reception to asylum applicants, Member States will 
find it increasingly convenient to resort to the use of detention.”213 This risk 
is exacerbated by the fact that the Reception Conditions Directive does not 
explicitly link the necessity criterion to the need to adequately consider 
 
209 Hailbronner argues that “if this clause is to be given any useful meaning, it must be 
based on a distinction between a set of legitimate reasons like prevention of 
unauthorised entry and residence, danger of flight etc.”, see: K. Hailbronner, 
‘Detention of Asylum Seekers’, 9 European Journal of Migration and Law (2007) 2, 
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210 ECRE, ‘Information Note on the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 
on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status’, 18 (October 2006) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publish
er,ECRE,,,464317ab2,0.html (last visited 2 May 2012). 
211 Art. 2 k) Asylum Procedures Directive. See Peers & Rogers, supra note 74, 304. 
212 Da Lomba, supra note 28, 246. 
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alternatives to detention. The lack of provision for such alternatives to 
detention risks making the necessity criterion meaningless. 
The Commission proposal to recast the Reception Conditions 
Directive is more ambitious. The proposal introduces a strict necessity test: 
“[w]hen it proves necessary and on the basis of an individual assessment of 
each case, Member States may detain an applicant, if other less coercive 
alternative measures cannot be applied effectively.”214 The proposal further 
enumerates an exhaustive list of grounds for the detention of asylum 
seekers: “an applicant may only be detained: (a) in order to determine or 
verify his/her identity or nationality; (b) in order to determine, within the 
context of a preliminary interview, the elements on which the application 
for international protection is based which could not be obtained in the 
absence of detention; (c) in the context of a procedure, to decide on the right 
to enter the territory; (d) when protection of national security or public order 
so requires.”215 Member States must “ensure that rules concerning 
alternatives to detention, such as regular reporting to the authorities, the 
deposit of a financial guarantee, or an obligation to stay at an assigned 
place, are laid down in national law.”216 Detention must be limited to “as 
short a period as possible” and can only be maintained for as long as the 
detention grounds are applicable.217 The proposal further sets out procedural 
guarantees for asylum seekers placed in detention218 and imposes minimum 
standards for detention conditions, including the requirement that 
“[d]etention shall only take place in specialised detention facilities.”219 The 
proposal finally contains stricter rules for the detention of vulnerable 
persons and persons with special reception needs.220 At this point it is 
unclear whether the Commission proposal will be adopted without 
significant amendments. In the past, discussions in the Council on asylum 
instruments have systematically led to a decrease in the level of human 
rights protection for asylum seekers in the final document. 
 
214 Art. 8 para. 2 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Recast) 
(Commission Proposal Reception Conditions), COM (2011) 320 final. 
215 Art. 8 para. 3 Commission Proposal Reception Conditions. 
216 Art. 8 para. 4 Commission Proposal Reception Conditions. 
217 Art. 9 para. 1 Commission Proposal Reception Conditions. 
218 Art. 9 Commission Proposal Reception Conditions. 
219 Art. 10 Commission Proposal Reception Conditions. 
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The proposal appears to be more in line with the (lenient) case law of 
the ECtHR. The addition of a strict necessity criterion would be in 
conformity with the necessity test under Art. 9 para. 1 ICCPR and Art. 6 of 
the Charter, as well as the prohibition of arbitrariness under Art. 5 para. 1 
ECHR. The obligation to consider less coercive alternatives is also to be 
hailed. Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) are construed in a way that can only 
justify detention in very restrictive circumstances. Sub-paragraph (c) can 
however be criticized as it allows for wide interpretation and thus may 
provide justification for the systematic detention of asylum seekers during 
the examination of their asylum application.221 As the detention grounds in 
the Commission proposal are “without prejudice [...] to detention in the 
framework of criminal proceedings”,222 sub-paragraph (d) is worrying 
because it is unclear how these goals cannot be served within the said 
framework. It is highly feasible that, in the event that the Commission 
proposal is adopted without significant amendments, these grounds are 
interpreted restrictively by the Court of Justice. 
It is a missed opportunity that the proposal does not entirely endorse 
the UNHCR guidelines on detention of asylum seekers, which recognize 
that “as a general principle asylum-seekers should not be detained.”223 In the 
light of the increasing amount of literature on alternatives for detention,224 it 
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is clear that the detention of asylum seekers will almost never be justified in 
concreto. Moreover, as the objective of asylum detention generally is to 
have some amount of control over the whereabouts of asylum seekers,225 it 
is important to note that evidence shows that in destination States, the 
likelihood of absconding is very low as asylum seekers want to be 
recognised as lawful residents.226 In any event, the aims mentioned to justify 
detention are already served in the asylum procedure itself: if an asylum 
seeker fails to cooperate with the authorities (sub-paragraphs (a) to (c)) or 
constitutes a danger to national security or public order (sub-paragraph (d)), 
Member States can apply an accelerated procedure and – if their legislation 
allows so – even declare an application manifestly ill-founded.227 Asylum 
detention can only be justified insofar as it actually serves these aims better, 
which will only rarely be the case. It would therefore have been preferable if 
the Commission proposal had construed the detention grounds more 
narrowly or, even better, simply prohibited detention.  
2. Dublin Detention 
The Commission proposal to recast Dublin II also contains safeguards to 
avoid excessive use of detention in the context of the procedure to transfer 
an asylum seeker or an applicant for subsidiary protection to the responsible 
Member State. As asylum seekers are frequently detained in the context of 
these procedures,228 the lack of such safeguards in the current Dublin II 
Regulation is striking.229 The proposal in turn only allows for detention in 
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case of a significant risk of absconding. The detention must be proven to be 
necessary, on the basis of an individual assessment of each case, and is only 
allowed if other less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively.230 In 
this respect, the proposal explicitly requires Member States to take into 
consideration alternatives to detention, such as regular reporting to the 
authorities, the deposit of a financial guarantee, an obligation to stay at a 
designated place or other measures to prevent the risk of absconding.231 The 
proposal only allows detention after the decision to transfer has been 
notified to the applicant, which is only possible after the requested Member 
State has agreed with the transfer.232 It does not contain time limits, but only 
allows detention for the shortest period possible, which shall be no longer 
than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative 
procedures for carrying out a transfer.233 
The adoption of this proposal would be a significant advancement in 
preventing the arbitrary use of detention in the context of the Dublin II 
procedure. Even if the proposed provision is adopted, the Dublin system 
will continue to lead to a widespread use of detention. These cases of 
detention are primarily motivated by the need of maintaining the Dublin 
system itself – a system which has proven to be totally inefficient in practice 
and which compromises the fundamental rights of asylum seekers – rather 
than actually serving a real legitimate aim. One could therefore argue that 
the Dublin system in itself is incompatible with the positive obligation to 
provide a legal framework to protect asylum seekers against the unnecessary 
and arbitrary use of detention. If one wishes to avoid arbitrary detention, it 
is therefore preferable to do away with the Dublin system altogether. 
G. Conclusion 
Over the past two decades, the European Union has become a major 
actor in the field of asylum law. Ever since its emergence, the relationship 
between European Asylum Law and human rights law has nonetheless been 
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tense. European Asylum Law mainly focuses on preventing abuses of the 
asylum system, restricting secondary movements of asylum seekers and 
efficiently disposing of asylum applications, rather than on adequately 
protecting the human rights of asylum seekers. This is related to the broader 
context of the emerging “Fortress Europe”: economic migrants are 
unwanted because of the alleged threat they pose to the sustainability of the 
model of the welfare State. As asylum seekers are primarily regarded as 
potential economic migrants, rather than as persons who may be in need of 
international protection, asylum law risks becoming an instrument of a 
restrictive immigration policy234. 
The emphasis of the Dublin II system of establishing which Member 
State is responsible to examine an asylum application, lies too much on 
efficiency and burden sharing considerations, rather than on human rights 
concerns. The basic assumption of the Dublin II system – that the receiving 
Member State offers asylum seekers a sufficient level of human rights 
protection – has not been fulfilled. Dublin transfers may therefore expose 
asylum seekers to inhuman or degrading detention and living circumstances, 
as well as to the risk of indirect refoulement. The European Court of Human 
Rights has recently made clear in its M.S.S. judgment that Art. 3 ECHR 
prohibits such transfers. The EU urgently needs a strong mechanism to 
monitor the Reception Conditions Directive and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive. The suspension mechanism provided for in the Commission 
proposal for a recast of the Dublin II Regulation would be a significant 
improvement. 
In the M.S.S. judgment, the Court has equally made clear that inhuman 
or degrading living circumstances violate Art. 3 ECHR. By referring to the 
obligations under the Reception Conditions Directive, the Court has 
strengthened the binding force of this document, thus compelling member 
States to take this piece of legislation seriously. This finding also requires 
the EU institutions to ensure that the recast of the Reception Conditions 
Directive sufficiently protects asylum seekers against destitution. 
The Reception Conditions Directive and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive lack sufficient safeguards to properly limit the Member States’ use 
of detention, which exposes asylum seekers to the risk of being arbitrarily 
detained. In the light of the frequent use of detention in Dublin procedures, 
the lack of safeguards in the Dublin II Regulation is particularly striking. In 
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order to avoid being branded as arbitrary, human rights law demands that a 
detention is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, which requires that less 
stringent measures have been considered and found to be insufficient. 
Although Commission proposals for a recast of these instruments are a step 
in the right direction, it would have been preferable to even further restrict 
the detention grounds, or even better, to simply prohibit the detention of 
asylum seekers. As the operation of the Dublin system in itself leads to a 
widespread use of detention, it would even be preferable to do away with 
this system altogether. 
This paper has identified certain problematic aspects of European 
Asylum Law. These aspects should be duly remedied by the EU institutions 
while recasting the existing asylum instruments. In the light of the EU’s 
increasing commitment towards human rights law, the effective respect for 
human rights should always be the primary concern of European Asylum 
Law. 
 
